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Abstract: Speculative posthumanism (SP) conceives posthumans as agents made 
inhuman by a technological disconnection or ‘withdrawal’ from human social systems 
(The disconnection thesis – DT). DT understands becoming nonhuman in terms of 
agential independence. An artefact like a robot is a ‘wide human’ so long as it depends 
on its human-related functions to exist. 
 But what is an agent? SP forecloses a purely conceptual response to this question 
because it rejects transcendental accounts of subjectivity founded in human experience 
or social practice (Unbounded Posthumanism – UP). UP renders this question illegitimate 
because it denies there is any theory of agency that could apply to all agents. Not only 
does DT not tell us what posthumans are like, it has no criteria for determining when 
disconnection occurs. 
 It follows that understanding the posthuman (if possible) must proceed without 
criteria. The content of unbounded posthumanism is produced by disconnection rather 
than by the schematic theoretical content of DT. I will argue that this implies an intimate 
relationship between the understanding and practice in posthumanism that allows us 
to draw fertile analogies between UP and two other ‘philosophies of the limit’ Derrida’s 
Deconstruction and Laruelle’s Non-Philosophy.
Disconnection
Speculative posthumanism (SP) is concerned with the prospect of a 
posthuman reality emerging from the technological alteration of the 
human one. This technological focus comports with a general concern 
with human-made futures that don’t include us. Outside fiction, our 
moral concern for a nonhuman future is prompted by the theorized 
potential of technology to drastically alter us or our environments. 
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Thus qualified, SP claims ‘there could be powerful nonhuman agents 
that arise through some human-instigated technological process’.1 
More precisely, posthumans are wide human descendants of humans 
who have become inhuman through some technical process. 
The concept of wide descent avoids bio-chauvinism. We don’t 
know where posthumans could come from or how. ‘Wide’ descendants 
can come from any part of the ‘Wide Human’ of humans and their 
technological objects, a system on which we depend much as it depends 
on us. Your toothbrush is wide human, as are you and your pet pig. 
Its emphasis on technogenesis means that SP is often conflated with 
Transhumanism That’s an egregious mistake. Transhumanists, like 
classical and modern humanists, hope to cultivate human capacities, 
such as reason and creativity, with advanced technologies such as 
artificial intelligence or germline genetic engineering. Transhumanism 
is an ethical claim to the effect that technological enhancement of 
capacities like intelligence or empathy is a good idea. 
SP, by contrast, is metaphysical. It says only that there could be 
posthumans; not that they would be better than us, or even comparable 
from a moral perspective.2 
This does not mean that SP is morally inconsequential but the 
metaphysics and epistemology of the posthuman drive the ethics, not 
vice-versa.
So how can we put bones on the thought of a nonhuman wide human 
descendant? A posthuman?
A plausible condition for any posthuman-making event is that the 
resulting nonhuman entities could acquire purposes not set by humans 
– and that this autonomy is due to some technological alteration in their 
powers. 
I call this claim the ‘Disconnection Thesis’ (DT). The core theoretical 
construct of SP.
DT says posthumans are feral technological entities. Less roughly, an 
X is posthuman if and only if X or its wide human ancestors originated 
in ‘Wide Human’ but now acts outside of it.3
1 David Roden, posthuman life: philosophy at the Edge of the Human (London, 2014), 112.
2 Ibid., 97–8, 108–9; Id., ‘The Disconnection Thesis’, in the Singularity Hypothesis: a Sci-
entific and Philosophical Assessment, eds. A. Eden, J. Søraker, J. Moor, & E. Steinhart 
(London, 2012), 281–98.
3 Roden, posthuman life, 109–13. 
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DT understands human-posthuman differences without being 
committed to a ‘human essence’ that posthumans will lack. This is a 
feature rather than a bug because if there is an essential human nature 
nobody knows what it is. So best get by without it. 4
Becoming posthuman, then, is a matter of acquiring a technologically 
enabled capacity for independent agency. 
DT is multiply satisfiable by beings with different technological 
origins and very different natures or powers (e.g. artificial intelligences, 
mind-uploads, cyborgs, synthetic life forms, etc.). This is as it should 
be since there are no posthumans and no substantive information on 
them, yet.
Nonetheless, DT has philosophical commitments which can be 
approached with varying stringency. The key variable is agency. 
Disconnection is stipulated to only involve agents. This is to avoid 
the trivial consequence that any formerly useful part of WH becomes 
posthuman when it ceases to have a human function. Hulks, ruins and 
discarded mobile phones are not posthumans because none exhibit 
agency following their loss of human-centred function.5
However, the concept of an agent can be relatively constrained or 
liberal. I refer to a version of SP with a constrained agency concept as 
‘bounded’; with a relatively liberal one as ‘unbounded’. 
Bounded Posthumanism
Posthumanism with constrained agency usually conforms to some 
moral conception of human life and is often indistinguishable from 
transhumanism. 
For example, in posthuman personhood Daryl Wennemann adopts 
a Kantian, rationalist conception of agency. He holds that true agency is 
personhood. Being a person requires one be answerable to reasons or 
in the space of reasons. A person can reflect on ‘himself and his world 
from the perspective of a being sharing in a certain community’. A 
person is reflective subject capable of belonging to a moral community, 
bound by norms of action, etc.6 
4 Ibid,, 113–15.
5 Ibid,, 127–30.
6 Daryl Wennemann, posthuman personhood (New York, 2013), 47.
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This stringent concept implies that, whatever the future throws up, 
posthuman agents will be social and, arguably linguistic beings like 
us, even if they are robots or computers, have strange bodies, or even 
stranger habits. 
A (First) Unbounded Posthumanism (UP1)
However, we can also can frame much more liberal agency requirements 
which need not involve the capacity for self-evaluation though social 
norms or rational autonomy. 
The agency concept I introduce in posthuman life only requires 
some degree of what I refer to there as ‘functional autonomy’.7 
This minimal agent is a self-maintaining system. Its functional 
autonomy measures its capacity to exploit the world to survive while 
becoming useful in its turn for other things. A drastic diminution of 
functional autonomy is a reduction in power that, for us, is experienced 
as harm. Arthritis of the back or limbs painfully reduces freedom of 
movement. Gaining new skills or becoming fitter increases functional 
autonomy or one’s capacity to affect and be affected.8
Hyperplasticity
However, we could envisage posthuman entities with equivalent or 
greater functional autonomy than us that do not satisfy the conditions 
for personhood or rational autonomy because they cannot answer to 
communal principles or norms. 
To bring the implications of this home, I’ll focus on what happens 
if we take functional autonomy to a monstrous limit: the case of the 
hyperplastic.
I call an agent ‘hyperplastic’ if it can make arbitrarily fine changes 
to its body or structure without compromising its capacity for 
hyperplasticity.9 
7 Roden, posthuman life, 125–41.
8 Manuel DeLanda, a new philosophy of Society: assemblage theory and Social Complexity 
(London, 2006), 50.
9 Hyperplasticity is discussed in greater detail in David Roden, ‘Reduction, Elimination and 
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Now, it is possible to argue that, if certain assumptions about the 
relationship between physical and mental properties hold, a hyperplastic 
agent would be uninterpretable for us. 
The assumption in question is modest. An antireductionism for 
which our mental life depends on our body’s physical state without 
being reducible to it or inferable from it. 
If mental life cannot be inferred from physical facts about a creature 
or vice-versa, a hyperplastic would have no use for concepts of belief, 
intention, or desire, for it would never be able to infer what it would 
believe or want from the physical or functional consequences a self-
intervention. Nor would it be able to preclude that some mental state 
would be deleted by another self-modification since, assuming anti-
reductionism, believing that Lima is capital of Peru or desiring to sail 
round the world, wishing it were Christmas, or similar such ‘intentional’ 
states are not reducible to the physical states on which they nonetheless 
depend. Thus, the common-sense or ‘folk’ psychology underlying our 
communal attachments would be effectively useless to hyperplastics. 
The limit of functional autonomy, or of plasticity, then, is not an 
immortal superhuman but something infinitely capable yet refractory 
to our ideas about mind and meaning. An entity inciting comparisons 
with the disgustingly shapeless Shoggoths that Lovecraft depicts in his 
novella, at the Mountains of Madness, or maybe Cthulhu himself.10
As stated, hyperplasticity is an ideal limit, what is interesting is 
whether we can approach it. Significant hyperplasticity may not be 
possible in worlds like ours. 
However, its introduction here is intended as salutary not 
demonstrative. To show that our conceptions of agency and subjectivity 
may be too parochial to travel far beyond our ecological niche. As a route 
to posthumanity, hyperplasticity would constitute an instance of what 
the deranged and deranging protagonists of R. Scott Bakker’s ultra-dark 
thriller neuropath call the ‘semantic apocalypse’ – the point at which 
the scientific predilection to eliminate meaning in the nonhuman world 
completes itself by extirpating the kingdom of persons or moral subjects.11 
Radical Uninterpretability’, 2015 www.academia.edu/15054582/Reduction_Elimination_
and_Radical_Uninterpretability. See also Roden, posthuman life, 100–3.
10 H.P. Lovecraft, ‘At the mountains of madness’, in the thing on the Doorstep and other 
Weird Stories (London, 2001).
11 R. Scott Bakker, neuropath (New York, 2010).
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If this, or an equivalent derangement of subjectivity and agency, is 
possible through disconnection, then bounded posthumanism is false 
and some regions of posthuman possibility space may be quite as 
weird as the ‘abysms of shrieking and immemorial lunacy’ hinted at in 
Lovecraft 
Before considering the implications of unbinding for our 
understanding of human-posthuman disconnection, I want to consider 
some complementary justifications for unbinding posthumanism with a 
lax as opposed to a stringent agency concept. 
Dark phenomenology
The first justification is the thesis concerning ‘dark phenomena’.12 
Dark phenomena are contents or structures of experience such 
that having them does not confer much or any understanding of them. 
For example, we seem to experience time as an open flow into the 
future. Many philosophers have thought that this flow is a condition 
(technically a ‘transcendental condition’) of experiencing objects and 
worlds. Phenomenologists like Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-
Ponty have argued that we can grasp this structure in experience and 
thus understand the structure of objectivity in any world.
But, if temporality is dark, experiencing it is philosophically 
overrated. For example, although this flow seems continuous we cannot 
know it is continuous without analysing it at ever finer grains. This 
seems to be as much beyond our powers of attention and memory as 
remembering very fine differences in colour. 
So, if lived time has the features it needs to give access to a world, 
its structure must elude us much as the fine structure of matter does. If 
so, how can we know it gives us worlds. How can we even know what 
a world is? 
Doing phenomenology can’t tell us what phenomenology is or can do. 
Our capacity for self-reflection exposes us to the simulation of a subject 
whose utterly non-subjective nature is entirely inaccessible to it.13
12 David Roden, ‘Nature’s Dark Domain: An Argument for a Naturalised Phenomenology’, 
Royal institute of philosophy Supplements, 72 (2013), 169–88; id., posthuman life, 82–104.
13 See Thomas Metzinger, Being no one: the Self-Model theory of Subjectivity (Cambridge, 
MA, 2004).
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Dark pragmatism
The second plank of my argument for the opacity of agency is aimed 
at the widely shared post-Hegelian consensus that serious agency is 
constituted by participation in linguistic or cultural practices. We 
have already seen an example of this in Wennemann’s appeal to the 
reflexivity afforded by the social bond but it is a staple of analytical 
and continental thought, from Wittgenstein to Sellars, from Habermas 
to Brandom. Clearly, if this is true, then hyperplastic agency is a 
contradiction in terms (as, incidentally, is almost any kind of agency 
on the part of nonhuman animals). However, if it can be shown to be 
incomplete in its own terms then we no longer need assume that agency 
is exhausted by our manifest image of it.
Explaining subjectivity and agency in terms of shared practices requires 
a durable account of how certain behaviours get to be evaluable as practices. 
I’ve argued that the most plausible account is to claim that behaviours are 
evaluable wherever a competent interpreter would judge them to be so. 14  
Unfortunately, this doubles subjectivity in such a way as to unbind it 
again. We have a first order subject accounted for by its participation in 
social practice. We have a second order, interpreter-subject presupposed 
but not explained by that first account. ‘[In] principle interpretability is ill-
defined unless we have some conception of what is doing the interpreting’ 
or what their competence would involve.15 
The common thread here is that bounding constraints invoke untamed 
‘wild’ principles which cannot be regimented or reined in. This form of 
argument is inspired by Jacques Derrida’s method of deconstruction. His 
close readings of philosophers like Kant, Husserl, and J.L. Austin were 
designed to show that their claims about consciousness, form, or meaning 
required an excessive and conceptually antithetic element outside their 
systems. For example, meaning requires repeatable symbols. Derrida 
argues that such repetition only works if symbols can also be abused or 
misused. So, no symbol can be defined by fixed rules of use. Which is the 
same as saying there are no meanings, no semantic essences.16
14 See David Roden, ‘On Reason and Spectral Machines: Robert Brandom and Bounded Post-
humanism’, in philosophy after nature, Rosie Braidotti and Rick Dolphijn (eds.) (London, 
2017), 99–119.
15 Id., posthuman life, 128; Id., ‘Spectral Machines’, 111.
16 Jacques Derrida, limited inc., S. Weber (trans.) (Evanston, IL, 1988).
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SP, deconstruction and The Philosophy of the Limit
Deconstruction is a form of what Drucilla Cornell refers to as ‘The 
Philosophy of the Limit’ (POL) – as is the afore-mentioned process of 
constraint peeling I call ‘unbinding’. 
POL’s strip away the artificial constraints that make the world in 
our image, layer by layer, concept by concept. What remains, as in 
deconstruction, is something other than a world, and perhaps something 
more or less than philosophy, but an encounter with a remainder or non-
meaning that philosophy cannot recognize or conceptualize.17
Reconsider the minimal agency model of unbound posthumanism. 
We should call this Unbound Posthumanism I (UP1) since yet more 
unbinding is necessary if we are to take this to the limit.
In UP1 all agents are assumed self-maintaining. But what is 
it to maintain oneself in the most general sense? Is it a tendency to 
preserve a certain organic boundary or core temperature? Why assume 
that posthumans have fixed tolerances, state blankets, or operating 
parameters? 
The extremum case of the hyperplastic suggests otherwise. 
Hyperplastics would lack structural invariance beyond the bare fact 
of hyperplasticity itself. They would not be self-maintaining in any 
sense that connects with the biological forms we know about. Above 
all, entertaining the possibility of a hyperplastic means thinking about 
agents we could not see, interpret or recognize as agents. 
Can we even think of an agent that we cannot recognise as an agent?
The problem ramifies to a dilemma, or a conversation between 
monsters Philosophy Scylla and Philosophy Charybdis:
Scylla – the criteria for attributing agency do not apply to all agents since hyperplastics 
are unrecognizable as agents. Thus, the concept agency extends beyond our capacity to 
recognize instances of it. 
Charybdis – Scylla, this seems absurd! How does any concept have an extension it is 
not applicable to? Being an agent must be coterminous with being recognizable as an 
one. Thus, hyperplastics would not count as agents according to first principles.
17 Drucilla Cornell, the philosophy of the limit (London, 1992), 1; Katerina Kolozova, Cut of 
the Real: Subjectivity in poststructuralist philosophy (New York, 2013), 99.
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However, opting for the whirlpool Charybdis does not save us from 
ruin if, as argued independently, the concept of agency can only be 
elucidated by some wild principle of subjectivity. We are simply left 
with quietist claims like ‘agents are the things we call agents relative 
to our background practices’. But appeal to some anthropological 
invariants, if such there are, is of no moment when, as with SP, we are 
considering the implications of the long-run eliminability of the human 
and, as with other posthumanists, contesting the limits and boundaries 
of the human. Yet, even SP in the form developed in posthuman life is 
not immune from this corrosion for unbinding arguments also threaten 
the ontological clarity of the disconnection thesis, not least by implying 
that the Wide Human system is just another reification of ‘us’, another 
tautological assertion of human privilege. 
Non-Posthumanism
If unbinding is justified (and I’ve indicated that it can be), posthumanist 
philosophy is at an impasse; not only because the speculative concept 
of the posthuman is undetermined in advance (that we knew!) but 
because DT is even disconnected from principled ways of identifying 
disconnections when and where they occur. We thus move from the 
first form of unbound posthumanism (UP1) that is still informed by a 
determinate agency concept to the limit version in which the concept 
has become maximally indeterminate. (UP2)
Such indeterminacy also held of the standard formulation of 
speculative posthumanism. As we noted, DT doesn’t provide any 
information about posthumans. Even with UP1, the only way we can 
acquire substantive knowledge of posthuman lives is through an event 
of synthesis or engineering: making posthumans, becoming posthuman. 
This, I think, is the ethical impasse of the posthuman, of modernity 
even. If we unbind the posthuman we cannot deliberate on becoming 
posthuman without pre-empting our deliberation. A ‘major’ or ‘state 
politics’ of disconnection is consequently impossible since the voices that 
will contribute to the decision cannot be fixed independently of challenging 
the very composition of voices, those with the right of decide.18 
18 Roden, posthuman life, 179–82.
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Posthuman prospects can be identified or evaluated only by bringing 
them about since that is the ideal knowledge state for such a political 
decision. As Steven Shaviro asks: 
 
How can we come to terms with forms of ‘knowledge’ whose very effect is to change 
who ‘we’ are? How do we judge these disciplines, when they undermine, or render 
irrelevant, the very norms and criteria that we use to ground our judgments?19 
UP1 referred to an abstract event of technogenesis that could not be 
decided within any pre-existing ethics or politics precisely because only 
it could produce the conditions under which it could be retroactively 
assessed. What changes with UP2) is that there is no longer a distinction 
between wide or narrow human or between wide human and posthuman 
to regiment its content. 
However, the problem of pre-emption has not gone away – our fatal 
entanglement with a planetary technology that is inhuman not because it 
is made of metal and plastic or lithium or silicon, but because its totality 
is not compliant to norms. It is not even an autonomous monster ruled 
by impersonal principles of efficiency.20 Its hypertrophy is contrary to 
any end or transcendent order.
With this historical and semantic background in view, I want to enlist 
Derrida again by describing disconnection as ‘a differential function 
without an ontological basis’.21
This formulation, which originally applied to Derridean textuality, 
is intended to reaffirm the affinity I broached earlier between unbound 
posthumanism and POL. 
Deconstruction, like other POLs, suspends philosophy’s assumption 
of sufficiency or competence, just as unbinding appears to cede 
philosophy’s relation to futurity. 
In what remains of this paper, I hope to use this affinity or 
analogy to begin to rethink the relationship between UP2 and the 
reality with which it is involved and thus help to understand the 
19 Steven Shaviro, Without Criteria: Kant, Whitehead, Deleuze, and aesthetics Cambridge 
Mass, 2012), 15.
20 Roden, posthuman life, 150–65.
21 Jacques Derrida, ‘My Chances/Mes Chances: A Rendez-vous with Some Epicurean Stereo-
phonies’, I.E. Harvey and Avital Ronell (trans.), in J.H. Smith and W. Kerrigan (eds.) Taking 
Chances: Derrida, Psychoanalysis and Literature (Baltimore MD, 1984), 16.
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pull, ethical or otherwise, of the posthuman in a world of ramifying 
technics.
We can illustrate this with two of examples of Derridean terms that 
are drawn from the phenomenology of subjective time: différance and 
trace. 
Différance (which utilizes the homonymy between the French verbs 
for differing and deferring) indicates a slippage between the now or 
present and an undetermined future. This present is always ‘vitiated’ 
by a not yet which undermines its stability.22 For example, the literal 
meaning or role of a word in a language depends on its history of use but 
also on the possibility of being affected by future decisions about use. 
However, subsequent uses and decisions, as in the legal interpretation of 
a constitutional notion such as the right to privacy, are not programmed 
by a prior system of rules, even if they are historically constrained 
or conditioned by them. 23 Thus, in the linguistic case, différance is a 
condition of meaning which cannot be expressed in terms of meanings. 
The ‘trace’ is another name for this susceptibility to modification 
or destruction through the passage to a new state. It is thus also a 
potentiality for memorization or return that is never betokened by 
determinate content. Again, it can also be interpreted libidinally as the 
inherent dynamism in desire, a deferral that can become indefinitely 
postponed through a relay of substitute objects or fetishes. 
Both trace or différance, then, refer to a bending back (fold, pli) that 
can never be given and is thus inconceivable and unpresentable. They 
split and fold subjectivity irrevocably. 
Since these structures are not experiencable, Derrida will re-use them to 
discuss other folds or splits in biological, linguistic, and social structures, 
not just minds. The account of the trace can thus be re-used beyond its 
origin to motivate a form of speculative materialism; a deconstruction of 
matter, if you will. For example, in his Radical atheism: Derrida and time 
of life, Martin Hägglund reads the trace as the inherent destructibility of 
any material mark or entity. Nothing in time can be closeted in the now 
if it is not to be stuck in a changeless present. Everything is hollowed by 
‘a relentless displacement in everything that happens’.24 
22 Jacques Derrida, Margins of philosophy, Alan Bass (trans.), (Chicago, 1984), 13–17.
23 Cornell, 148–9.
24 Martin Hägglund, Radical atheism: Derrida and the time of life (Stanford CA., 2008), 17.
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Différance and trace thus have a topic neutrality which slips beyond 
the field of subjectivity much as disconnection slips beyond the 
philosophy of the posthuman future. 
However, even this extra-philosophical status is insufficiently 
radical as an analogy for the caesura between UP2 and philosophy. For 
unbinding gives us almost nothing other than the fact of technological 
pre-emption. Particularly, as the instance of the hyperplastic shows, it 
does not guarantee that this pre-emption can be understood in terms 
of the categories appropriate to subjectivity, such as meaning or the 
subjective time of conscious experience.
Différance and trace mark a simultaneous dependence upon 
unmeaning processes of alteration but do so in terms of the slippages, 
equivocations or blind spots these generate in meaning, intentionality, 
and experience. Or as François Laruelle, has suggested in his principle 
of non-philosophy, deconstruction still abides within the assurance 
of philosophy’s ability to adequately grasp structures of meaning and 
temporality. Différance is an otherness that ‘protrudes from unity’. 
Its disunifying power thus reiterates the assumption of Philosophy’s 
sufficiency to grasp and order the real.25  Bakker poses this more clearly 
when he argues that deconstruction operates within a philosophical 
idiom that cannot theorize its own inability to understand its non-
conceptual and non-phenomenological conditions – the conditions that 
I have glossed under the rubric of ‘dark phenomenology’:
One way to put Derrida’s point is that there is always some occluded context, always 
some integral part of the background, driving phenomenology. From an Anglo-
American, pragmatic viewpoint, his point is obvious, yet abstrusely and extravagantly 
made: Nothing is given, least of all meaning and experience. What Derrida is doing, 
however, is making this point within the phenomenological idiom, ‘reproducing’ it, as 
he says in the quote. The phenomenology itself reveals its discursive impossibility.26
However, as we have seen the legibility or the future and even the 
present are at issue in SP. Thus, the deconstructive argument for the 
necessity of trace or iterability on the grounds that they are conditions 
25 François Laruelle, principles of non-philosophy (New York, 2013), 54.
26 R. Scott Bakker ‘Derrida as Neurophenomenologist’ [web blog],  4 October 2016 https://
rsbakker.wordpress.com/2016/10/04/derrida-as-neurophenomenologist/ (Accessed 2 Sep-
tember 2017).
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of legibility or consciousness is moot here. SP is an attempt to 
address the long-run implications of technological modernity which, 
unlike transhumanism, rejects the transcendent moral status of the 
human subject or person as well as any subject-like or language-like 
transcendental organizing principles. Thus, unbound posthumanism 
is immanentist in so far as it brackets hierarchical conceptions of this 
‘long-run’ which deconstruction still appears to require.27 
This context is incomplete or open because the planetary engine is 
non-purposive, counter-final, not a project. It voids itself without ever 
having an itself. This means that philosophies of technology, like the 
work of Benard Stiegler, which conceptualize technology primarily 
as a supplement to experience, memory, and meaning, a ‘primordial 
artefactuality of the spirit’ as he puts it, may still be too anthropocentric 
to appreciate the stake of the posthuman condition.28 Stiegler’s work 
begins with the Derridean idea that technics both supplements and 
supplants (alters) the subjective life to which it is added. But this 
‘logic of supplementarity’ is still pitched as a division of presence; a 
displacement or division of the origin, whereas even the relevance of 
this displacement is not assured for SP.29
This implies a potentially instructive analogy with a second POL: 
Laruelle’s own Non-philosophy, of which a very inadequate sketch 
follows: 
Non-philosophy goes further than deconstruction by suspending 
what Laruelle terms the ‘philosophical decision’, a term for any 
analysis of the real into form and content. For Laruelle, as we have 
seen, Derrida doesn’t abandon this mixture-making but treats the trace 
as yet another transcendent organising principle for the empirical field 
of non-philosophical entities.30 
In contrast, Non-philosophy does not attempt to think or 
conceptualise the real at all. The real is no longer a topic or object of 
27 See Alex Dubilet, ‘Non-Philosophical Immanence, or Immanence Without Secularisation’, 
in D. Lewin, S.D. Podmore, and D. Williams (eds.), Mystical theology and Continental 
Philosophy: Interchange in the Wake of God (New York, 2017), 232–3.
28 ‘Symptomatology of the Month of January 2015 in France’, Paper delivered by Bernard 
Stiegler on 4 June 2015 at ‘Authorizing the Human Person in a Cosmopolitan Age’, Notre 
Dame Global Gateway, Rome.
29  Bernard Stiegler. Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus, Vol. 1 (Stanford, CA, 
1998).
30 Laruelle, 53–4.
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enquiry – as is the case with traditional realism – but the medium in 
which all philosophical decisions operate. This is because it is radically 
autonomous and non-relational; not given ‘relative to Being, to the 
Other’ or to even thought itself.31 Thought can obviously think ‘about’ 
itself, as we are doing here but, for Laruelle, this is already operating 
‘in-One’ (that is as radically autonomous or non-related) independently 
of interpretative decisions made by philosophies of thought such as 
idealism or realism.32
Thus understood, thought is not bonded to the real by intentionality 
or semantics. Rather all varieties of thought are actuated by it in a 
unilateral relation of pure passivity. In this, as John Ó. Maoilearca has 
argued, all forms of thought are equal since there is no transcendent 
meta-thought that can organize the universe only a series of ‘clones’ or 
mutational variants generated by it.33 
Philosophy has no privileged status as a means of accessing the world 
in Non-philosophy. It is just another raw material for performances which 
could be artistic, political, erotic, poetic, or inhuman or posthuman, in 
a field devoid of anything beyond simulacra of transcendence – much 
as unbound posthumanism holds. Philosophy is a marionette dancing 
to strings suspended from an invisible point, like the ‘clown puppet’ 
apparition that reiterates for no reason, floating before the hapless 
narrator of Thomas Ligotti’s horror story of that name.34 
Using non-philosophy as a model, posthuman disconnection may 
be conceivable as an instance of the non-transcendental marionette 
or clone. Disconnection remains to be specified through production; 
immanently related as a precursor of ‘disconnection’, perhaps 
comparably to the twitter hashtag and the search options it generates. 
Posthumanism thus does not think a world. It composes one.
I think this (tentative) analogy between SP and NP may be fruitful 
insofar as it explains how the posthuman operates contingently through 
humans and nonhuman agents, a differing cloned through unbinding. 
31 Ibid., 23.
32 Ibid., 27.
33 J.Ó. Maoilearca, All thoughts are equal: Laruelle and nonhuman philosophy (Minneapolis, 
2015). One might cavil here. It’s far from clear that removing transcendental order suffices 
for equality. Maybe the democratic rhetoric of Non-Philosophy is inflated.
34 Thomas Ligotti, ‘The Clown Puppet’ in teatro Grotesco (London, 2008), 53–64.
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